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As a re-occupation of land immediately in front of Parliament House for six months in 1972, 
the Aboriginal Embassy was an inspiring demonstration of Aboriginal self-determination and 
land rights. The Embassy re-appeared intermittently throughout the 1970s and 1980s, with a 
demonstration held at the site annually on Australia/Invasion Day. It has maintained a 
continuous presence in Canberra since it was reinstated on its twentieth anniversary in 1992 
to declare Aboriginal sovereignty in opposition to the formal reconciliation process. 
Reconciliation is understood as aligned with a progressive politics within mainstream public 
discourse in Australia. In this paper, we examine the reactionary politics of reconciliation 
vis-à-vis the struggle for land rights that the Embassy embodies. To this end we examine a 
debate within legal theory about the relation between ‘constituted power’ (state sovereignty) 
and ‘constituent power’ (democratic praxis). Following Antonio Negri, the Embassy can be 
understood as one manifestation of the constituent power of Aboriginal people (and their non-
Aboriginal supporters) that the Australian state appropriates to shore up its own defective 
claim to sovereignty. We illustrate this by comparing the symbolism of the Aboriginal 
Embassy with that of Reconciliation Place in Canberra. We complicate this analysis by 
discussing how the Embassy strategically exploits the ambiguous status of Aboriginal people 
as citizens within and without the community presupposed by the Australian state. In doing so 
the Embassy makes present the possibility of a break with the colonial past that is often 
invoked in the politics of reconciliation but which the Australian state has failed to enact. 
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The question of the relation between constituent and constituted power goes to the heart of the 
issue of political legitimacy in a democratic society. If constituted power refers to the 
institutionalized authority of the offices of state, with whose authority are these offices 
instituted? In a democracy, ultimate authority rests with ‘the people’, the constituent power 
that the state represents. Yet if the people are the ultimate authors of the law, does this entail 
that a people must exist independently of the constitution through which it represents itself? 
Or is it only by virtue of a constitution (and hence its formal representation) that a people is 
able to recognize itself as a political subject in the first place? The political stakes of this 
conceptual paradox are particularly acute in colonial societies, which excluded first nations 
from the constituent power that authorized their constitutions. Such states have only 
retroactively recognized indigenous people as citizens as they have sought to overcome the 
irresolution at the heart of a constitutional order founded by internal colonization. In this 
context, the question emerges whether the original exclusion of first nations from the 
constituent power of the people can be overcome immanently by drawing on the normative 
resources inherent within the existing constitutional order. Or is a more fundamental rupture 
with the constituted order of the colonial state required, which would fundamentally 
reconfigure the identity of the political community? 
We take up this question in the Australian context by examining the politics of 
reconciliation against claims for Aboriginal sovereignty. In the 1990s, Australia sought to 
redress its colonial origin by instituting a policy of reconciliation. Reconciliation processes 
are often criticized for demanding that the victims of state repression relinquish their 
legitimate claims to justice for the sake of national unity. In the absence of a constituent 
moment that would provide the foundation for a new regime, reconciliation processes in 
settler-colonial societies are particularly vulnerable to this critique. In Australia, critics claim 
that the formal reconciliation process was a further stage in the colonial project of 
assimilating the Aboriginal population into the colonizing society. Against reconciliation, 
3 
many Aboriginal people insist that their sovereignty was never ceded. This claim represents 
both an assertion of the right to self-determination and a refusal to recognize the legitimacy of 
the settler-colonial state that has incorporated them as citizens. 
We present the formal reconciliation process as an attempt to redress the legitimacy 
crisis of the Australian state from within the constituted order. In contrast, we treat the 
Aboriginal Embassy protest in Canberra as a constituent act that contests the constituted order 
of the Australian state from without by demonstrating Aboriginal sovereignty. Understanding 
these two modes of constitutional politics in terms of the antagonistic relation between 
constituent and constituted power provides a basis for further thematizing the reactionary 
politics of reconciliation. However, we also consider the limits of understanding the relation 
between constituent and constituted power in terms of a binary opposition between creation 
and reaction. In this light, we discuss how the political effectiveness of the Embassy depends 
on exploiting the ambiguous position of Aboriginal people as both inside and outside the 
constituted order, as citizens within and without the political community presupposed by the 
constitutional order 
 
Breaking with the Colonial Past: Aboriginal Sovereignty Versus National Reconciliation 
In 1991, the Labor government initiated a ten-year formal reconciliation process in Australia. 
The primary remit of the newly established Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation (CAR, 
1991-2001) was to improve relationships between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples and the wider Australian community through education. In 1994 a public inquiry was 
established to investigate the widespread practice of removing Aboriginal children of mixed 
descent from their families throughout most of the twentieth century. By the time it published 
its report in 1996, a conservative government was in power. The Howard government 
questioned the validity of the report’s findings (most notably that the practice of child 
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removal constituted an act of genocide) and failed to implement its recommendations (which 
included an apology by the Australian government). A polarising debate ensued within the 
mainstream media over the issue of the genocide perpetrated against Aboriginal people in 
Australia, which became known as the history wars. Howard’s refusal to apologize mobilized 
significant popular support for reconciliation from many non-Aboriginal people, through 
organizations such as Australians for Native Title and Reconciliation (ANTaR) (see Short 
2008). 
When Labor returned to power in 2008, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd said sorry to the 
stolen generations in the first sitting of Parliament. Although the formal reconciliation process 
came to an end in 2001, Rudd’s apology appeared to many as the crowning achievement of 
the reconciliation process, which had been stalled by the Howard government (1996-2007). 
The apology provided official recognition of the devastating impact of the removal policies 
on individuals, families and communities. Yet Rudd (2008) also attributed a broader historic 
importance to his apology since he sought to enact a constituent moment in the nation’s 
history that would establish a ‘new beginning’ (see Muldoon & Schaap forthcoming). This 
was not simply an opportunity for ‘sentimental reflection’, Rudd claimed, but ‘one of those 
rare moments in which we might just be able to transform the way in which the nation thinks 
about itself’ (Rudd 2008).1 
The apology was broadly welcomed by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people as 
long overdue official recognition of the suffering inflicted on them (Moses 2011). However, 
many resisted the sense of resolution in Rudd’s rhetoric, insisting that ‘unfinished business’ 
remains. This unfinished business referred to the need for reparative measures such as 
compensation (Muldoon 2009). But it also referred to the status of Aboriginal people within 
the constitution. In a speech given on the day of the apology, for instance, Patrick Dodson 
(2008, 22), a former Chairman of the CAR, pointed to the outstanding need to ‘cement an 
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honoured and respected place for Indigenous people within our polity.’ So long as Aboriginal 
people were ‘still unrecognised within the constitution’, he said, the legitimacy of the country 
would remain compromised: ‘the concept of terra nullius persists’ (Dodson 2008, 21). In 
contrast to the culture war waged by social conservatives, the reconciliation movement 
understood itself to be progressive. But this ignored the fact that reconciliation emerged in the 
first place as a reaction to the campaign for a treaty by Aboriginal people throughout the 
1970s and 1980s.2 
Against the impulse of the reconciliation movement to enact a moment of closure on the 
colonial past, the insistence on unfinished business by Aboriginal people highlights the 
continuing dynamics of colonization in the present (e.g. Kelly 1993, 3).3 Kevin Gilbert 
provided a powerful statement of this at the beginning of the reconciliation process in 1992. 
Deploring the turn in official policy from a treaty to reconciliation, Gilbert asked: 
What are we to reconcile ourselves to? To a holocaust, to a massacre, to the 
removal of us from our land, from the taking of our land? The reconciliation 
process can achieve nothing because it does not…promise justice. It does not 
promise a Treaty and it does not promise reparation for the taking away of our 
lives, our lands and our economic and political base. Unless it can return to us 
those very vital things…what have we? A handshake? A Symbolic dance? An 
exchange of leaves and feathers or something like that? (Gilbert 1993, 2) 
For Gilbert and many others, the possibility of breaking with the colonial past depends on the 
recognition of Aboriginal sovereignty. The legitimacy of the Australian state rests on the 
presumption that there was no recognisable legal or political organisation on the continent 
prior to the arrival of the British Crown. Consequently, the insistence on Aboriginal 
sovereignty fundamentally contests the basis of the constitutional order: it is the ‘polar 
opposite of terra nullius’ (Nicoll 2002, 4). 
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For many Aboriginal people, the Tent Embassy camped on the lawns in front of Old 
Parliament House is an important demonstration of the sovereignty they have never ceded to 
the colonizing state and society. Over the past four decades, the Embassy has been erected 
and re-erected in response to attempts by the Australian state to defuse claims for Aboriginal 
rights. The original protest in 1972 united Aboriginal people around the demand for uniform 
national land rights. The 1960s had seen the development of a pan-Aboriginal political 
consciousness and the assertion of self-determination by taking control of organizations such 
as the Federal Council for Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders (FCAATSI) (Foley 2010). 
While ownership of land has always been central to local struggles for justice by Aboriginal 
people, the demand for uniform national land rights found renewed national expression in the 
Embassy protest (Goodall 1996; Robinson 1993). 
The four activists who initiated the demonstration by plating a beach umbrella on the 
lawn in front of Parliament House on 26 January 1972 did so in protest against Prime Minister 
McMahon’s rejection of land rights.4 McMahon instead endorsed a weak form of title called 
general purpose leases for communities still living on their traditional land, which would 
ensure the continued exploitation of the land by the mining and pastoral industries. Since 
McMahon’s statement effectively relegated Aboriginal people to the status of ‘aliens in our 
own land’, recalls Gary Foley (2001), ‘as aliens we would have an embassy of our own’. 
Michael Anderson, declared that the Aboriginal Embassy would remain indefinitely: ‘We 
mean business. We will stay until the Government listens to us’ (cited in Attwood & Markus, 
1999, 257). In that year, the Embassy protest swelled into one of the largest and most 
significant demonstrations in Australia’s history (see Peters-Little 1992; Robinson 1994; 
Foley 2001; Lothian 2007).5 
Significantly, the Aboriginal Embassy has maintained a continuous presence in the 
Parliamentary Triangle since it was re-erected on its twentieth anniversary in protest against 
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the Labor government’s abandonment of a treaty in favour of the ten-year formal 
reconciliation process. Although the 1972 demonstration had put land rights on the national 
agenda and helped to remove McMahon’s conservative government, the protestors pointed 
out that little had changed for Aborigines in Australia in the intervening decades (Canberra 
Times 1992; Aubin 1992; Easterbrook 1992; Foley & Anderson 2006). The following day 
around sixty Aboriginal people, together with non-Aboriginal supporters, occupied the then 
disused Old Parliament House and flew the Aboriginal flag from it. At a press conference in 
King’s Hall, Billie Craigie (one of the four original protestors) said that the Embassy had 
transferred its operations to Old Parliament House. It would stay ‘indefinitely until we can 
work out our own Aboriginal government and maybe fill up the rest of the building with 
elected members from our own, Indigenous, sovereign nation’ (cited in The Advertiser 
28/1/1992). On 28 January, Paul Coe (also a central figure in the 1972 protest) presented the 
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Robert Tickner, with a Declaration of Aboriginal sovereignty 
and demanded an internationally supervised treaty.6 Later that evening the demonstrators 
withdrew from Old Parliament House to the Embassy, leaving four people to be arrested and 
charged with trespass under the Public Order Act.7 The Embassy activists hoped the arrests 
would strengthen their sovereignty case in the High Court and in the International Court of 
Justice in the Hague, if necessary (Chamberlain 1992). 
 
The Constituent Power of the Aboriginal Embassy 
The much-debated constitutional paradox is fundamentally a chicken-or-the-egg problem. 
Which came first: the people or the law? This raises important questions about the relative 
priority of constituent action and constitutional order. Jürgen Habermas purports to resolve 
the paradox by appealing to the co-originality of the constituent power (democratic praxis) 
and the constituted power (rule of law). In his view, there is no need to accord priority either 
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to democratic will (constituent power) or legal reason (constituted power) because they stand 
in a relation of mutuality: ‘one is not possible without the other, but neither sets limits on the 
other’ (Habermas 2001, 767). This resolution depends on adopting a dynamic understanding 
of the constitution as a future-oriented source of norms rather than a backward-looking 
constraint on the present. As Habermas would have it, the allegedly paradoxical relation 
between constituent and constituted power resolves itself in the dimension of historical time 
as the democratic assembly progressively realises the immanent potential of the original 
constitutional settlement. From this perspective, political struggles are part of a self-correcting 
learning process in which the hitherto poorly satisfied conditions of constitutional legitimacy 
are gradually corrected through the inclusion of marginalised groups and the empowerment of 
deprived classes (775).8 The historical violence through which every polity is constituted in 
fact, is redeemed (over time) by reference to the virtual consensus to which the constitutional 
order appeals through law. 
Against this view, Antonio Negri (1999) characterises the relationship between 
constituent and constituted power as one of irreducible antagonism. In Negri’s account, the 
distinction between constituent and constituted power correlates to two antithetical modes of 
politics.9 Negri identifies constituent power with democratic praxis but characterizes 
constituted power as fundamentally anti-democratic. While constituted power is reactive and 
can produce nothing on its own, constituent power is inherently creative: it coincides with the 
experience of free action, which ‘becomes public space, constituting a communicative 
relation, its own conditions of possibility’ (Negri 1999, 15). It does not only produce legal 
norms but also community. As such, constituent power exceeds its representation in 
institutional forms. Its creativity threatens the constituted power and gives rise to efforts to 
contain it. Like the relation between capital and living labour, constituted power is parasitic 
on the productivity of constituent power, which it captures and channels for its own ends. 
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Negri’s analysis presents some conceptual difficulties.10 For our present purpose, 
however, we want to accept his political rationale for insisting on a fundamental antagonism 
between constituent and constituted power. In short, the co-originality principle becomes 
ideological in the context of actually existing democracies. For it obscures the social struggle 
in which constituent power is enacted by subordinating it to the terms of representation 
available within the constituted order (see Schaap 2008). In practice, the doctrine of the co-
originality of constituent and constituted power means that social conflict is re-presented as 
already internal to the political community that the constituted power presupposes. But to 
view constituted power from the perspective of these struggles is to recognize the political in 
the moment of antagonism – the moment in which the possibility of constituting the polity 
otherwise appears (Christodoulidis 2007, 189). Focusing on antagonism enables us to 
recognize that social struggle is not simply about conflict between particular interests or 
identities and their possible reconciliation. It also entails disagreement over the political: the 
common interest, identity and/or norms in terms of which conflict is represented, mediated 
and potentially resolved. 
In this section we thematize the opposition between Aboriginal sovereignty and the 
politics of reconciliation in terms of the antagonism between constituent and constituted 
power. We contrast the Aboriginal Embassy with Reconciliation Place according to their 
spatial, temporal and subjective dimensions. This phenomenological analysis serves to 
illuminate the political stakes of the constitutional paradox in a community founded by 
colonization. Importantly, the distinctions we draw here are not anthropological but political. 
The point of the juxtaposition is not to work out which embodies the more authentic version 
of Aboriginal politics, but to highlight the different modes of constitutional politics that each 
site symbolises and enacts. Reconciliation Place represents conflict as something internal to 
the political community, resolvable through appeals to existing constitutional norms of civic 
equality and non-discrimination. The Aboriginal Embassy, in contrast, seeks a register for the 
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conflict beyond its constitutional mediation in order to contest the legitimacy of the 
constituted power. By challenging the right of the colonizing society to occupy and rule the 
territory known as Australia, the Embassy politicises the foundation of the constitutional 
order and demonstrates the possibility of its radical transformation. 
 
The Presence of the Aboriginal Embassy 
Constituted power codifies and polices territory. It polices space through the prohibition of 
certain activities and movements. But it also renders action meaningful in specific ways. It 
determines, for instance, whether people are involved in a properly public activity (such as 
protesting) or a properly private one (such as camping). Constituent power, in contrast, is a 
generative force that creates public places. It re-orders the space of constituted power by re-
configuring what can be seen, done and named within it. While constituted power is 
concerned with policing public space to regulate, codify and sanction action, constituent 
power is concerned with producing public places in which people can enact and articulate 
alternative forms of political community. 
Reconciliation Place exemplifies the constitutional ordering of space. Located in the 
ceremonial precinct of the Australia’s capital city, it complements and reinforces the 
monumental landscape of the Parliamentary Triangle whose axial lines connect the major 
institutional symbols of the Australian State. Reconciliation Place was commissioned by the 
Federal Government’s National Capital Authority (NCA) to acknowledge and commemorate 
the journey of reconciliation as a joint undertaking between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
Australians. The composition consists of a grove of sculptural slivers, each of which 
represents an episode in the reconciliation process. This grove can be navigated in multiple 
ways. The variety of perspectives afforded by this arrangement suggests the contestability of 
reconciliation. This apparent multiplicity is over-ridden, however, by the way the site of 
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Reconciliation Place reinforces the axial geometry of the landscape by forming a pedestrian 
link between the National Library and the National Gallery (Vernon 2002). In this context, it 
elides any reference to the colonial legacy to which reconciliation is supposed to respond. 
Instead, like the structures it binds and connects, Reconciliation Place memorialises the civil 
order constituted by the Australian state. 
The neo-classical structure of Old Parliament House is nestled within the apex of the 
Parliamentary triangle with the imposing new Parliament House located above and behind it 
on Capital Hill. But as you look out to the National War Memorial from the steps of Old 
Parliament House an Aboriginal flag flying from a natural wooden pole disrupts the 
symmetry of the monumental vista. The flag is flown by the Aboriginal Embassy: a semi-
permanent encampment comprised of a range of makeshift and constantly changing 
structures. These include a shipping container, a demountable shed, an array of gunyahs 
[traditional shelters], a perpetual fire, a collection of tents, a mural painting and several native 
trees that have been planted by activists over the years (Vernon 2002). This pointedly anti-
monumental architecture suggests both invasion and inversion. On the one hand, it is 
reminiscent of Aboriginal camps on the outskirts of rural towns and the material conditions 
that many Aboriginal people continue to endure (Dow 2000). On the other hand, as a re-
assertion of sovereign entitlement it evokes a prior order of occupation that preceded that 
which the colonial state seeks to monumentalize. In both modes, the Embassy not only 
displaces the monumental order and its formal public sphere, it constitutes an alternative 
public space to that authorized by the state. It brings into being a subaltern counter-public 
(Cowan 2001; Jaireth 1999). 
The potent symbolism of the Embassy thus stands in marked contrast to the pallid 
symbolism of Reconciliation Place. Its indefinite presence within the Parliamentary Triangle 
unsettles and discomforts, provoking attempts to sanitize it (De Lorenzo 2005). The 
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construction of Reconciliation Place was motivated (at least, in part) by the desire of officials 
and politicians to replace the ‘eyesore’ of the Embassy with a more pleasing re-presentation 
of the place of Aboriginal people within the nation (Dow 2000). It was intended to be a 
‘permanent memorial that all Australians would be proud of [and which] might have more 
reconciliation value’ than the Embassy (Mac Donald cited in Canberra Times 1999; Lawson 
2001; Canberra Times 2002). What some officials characterise as an eyesore, however, 
activists characterise as ‘counter-memorialising’ (Dwyer 2006, 199). Unlike Reconciliation 
Place, which is purposefully designed to blend in to its surrounds, the Aboriginal Embassy 
employs the landscape as a medium of protest, frustrating attempts by the constituted power 
to monopolise the meaning of public space (Harris 2003). As Irene Watson (2009a, 30) 
writes, the Embassy is a ‘space in which the dispossession of land rights and sovereignty are 
spoken back to the state’ by the ‘unsettled native.’ As an unauthorized and indefinite 
occupation, the Embassy inserts a place for unmediated political communication within an 
official public space that is designed only for circulation (Iveson 2001, 368). 
 
The Event of the Aboriginal Embassy 
Constituted power presupposes a unitary and linear conception of time that establishes an 
unbroken relation between the origin, present and end of the political community. This 
enables the history of the nation to be represented as a progressive widening and deepening of 
its imperfect democratic origin. In contrast, constituent power appears as an event that 
ruptures the temporal order of constituted power, drawing its authority from its own potential. 
Constituted power reacts to the event of constituent power by representing it as a crisis that 
provides an opportunity for reinstating the ruptured context. But the event of constituent 
power resists such domestication precisely because the beginning it enacts overflows the 
significations available within the temporal order of the constituted power. 
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The linear conception of time through which the constituted power legitimates itself is 
the underlying organisational principle at work in Reconciliation Place. The site memorializes 
the gradual inclusion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people within the Australian 
nation as equal citizens. The path used to navigate the site symbolizes the journey of 
reconciliation as visitors encounter slivers that commemorate moments of recognition and 
political achievement. Over time new slivers will be commissioned to commemorate further 
events in an apparently open-ended and ever-inclusive process. The flip side of this 
presumption of progress is that the site remains deaf to political regressions and back-flips. 
For instance, sliver three (called ‘strength, service and sacrifice’) pays homage to Aboriginal 
servicemen. However, it fails to acknowledge that the soldiers demobbed after World War II 
returned to a racially discriminatory society prepared to confiscate their land and remove their 
children while they were away and refuse them entry to the Returned Servicemen League 
upon their return (De Lorenzo 2005, 116; Curthoys 2000). Nothing appears in Reconciliation 
Place that contradicts the narrative of progressive inclusion through which the Australian 
nation seeks to redeem itself from its colonial origins (Jaireth 1999). 
In contrast, as Oliver Feltham (2004) argues, the Aboriginal Embassy is marked as a 
singular event by its discontinuity with this narrative. Construed as the progressive 
democratization of the Australian polity through the recognition of the rights of Aboriginal 
people as equal citizens, the journey of reconciliation is predicated on the tragic loss of 
Aboriginal sovereignty and entitlement to land. Even as the constituted power pursues 
normative redemption through the belated recognition of past wrongs, it re-inscribes the 
absence of a distinct Aboriginal polity and system of tenure.11 The Embassy disrupts this 
temporal order of representation by making present what the constituted order presupposes as 
absent: the sovereignty of Aboriginal people. The demonstration makes the time of 
Aboriginal possession contemporaneous with the present (not to mention any possible future) 
of the Australian polity. This disruption of the temporal sequence of settler-colonial 
14 
occupation receives poignant representation through the names the Ambassadors assign to 26 
January: the anniversary of the arrival of the British in 1788, which the colonizing society 
commemorates as ‘Australia Day’. On the one hand, the Ambassadors re-signify the national 
holiday as Invasion Day, contesting the legal assumption that Australia was founded as a 
‘settlement’ rather than ‘conquest’. On the other hand, they re-signify it as Sovereignty Day, 
implicitly commemorating 26 January as the anniversary of the founding of the Embassy 
when the pan-Aboriginal entitlement to universal national land rights found dramatic political 
expression. 
Predictably the crisis that the Embassy represents for the constituted power has 
prompted attempts to reinstate its own temporal order. In 1988 Old Parliament House, in front 
of which the Tent Embassy continues to be encamped, was vacated as the seat of government. 
Old Parliament House now houses the National Museum of Democracy, which showcases the 
history of Australian Democracy.12 The Museum depicts the struggle for Aboriginal rights in 
Australia as part of what Habermas would characterize as the self-correcting process of a 
constitutional democracy. Tellingly the Museum re-presents the 1972 Tent Embassy 
demonstration as an historical event within this narrative of democratization, politely ignoring 
the unfolding event of the Embassy across the road.13 In this setting the constituent power of 
the Aboriginal Embassy is folded into the self-legitimating narrative of the Australian state 
according to which the struggle for land rights and sovereignty is resolved through 
progressive legislation (in this case the Northern Territory Land Rights Act 1975 and the 
Native Title Act of 1993). The reactionary nature of this revisionist history is most profoundly 
seen in the constituted power’s appropriation of the concept of self-determination as a policy 
instrument.14 However the Embassy resists this appropriation by demonstrating Aboriginal 
self-determination, not as a norm to be redeemed by reference to the constitutional origin, but 
as fact actualised in the present. As the Embassy insists: ‘Always was, always will be 
Aboriginal land’. 
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The Community of the Aboriginal Embassy 
Constituted power posits a people as the origin of its legitimacy. In doing so, it presupposes a 
political community (an identity of interests among citizens) that it claims to represent. This 
presupposition is the basis a legal order founded on the principle of state sovereignty. For it 
represents all conflict as potentially resolvable in terms of the shared norms of the political 
community. The political community that the constituted power represents is thus over-
determined: any claim that would contest the basis of this political community cannot be 
heard in law (see Schaap 2009). In contrast, the community that constituent power produces is 
an open set of relations that is always in the process of becoming common. Antagonism is a 
condition of possibility of the creativity of constituent power since it leads to a reflexive 
awareness both of a common oppression and a shared resolve to refuse this oppression. In 
refusing the mediation of conflict within the prevailing terms of political discourse, 
antagonism anticipates a proto-political community that is beyond the representational order 
of the constituted power. 
To the extent that Reconciliation Place recognises conflict it construes it as internal to 
‘the people’. The site acknowledges the existence of conflicts (symbolised by several of the 
slivers) only to domesticate them through their incorporation within the boundaries of the 
existing normative order (symbolised by Reconciliation Place). At the official opening of 
Reconciliation Place in 2002, then PM John Howard, described the site as ‘a focal point for 
Australians of different backgrounds who reflect upon those things that bind us together and 
give us our common values as Australians’ (Howard 2002). This centripetal orientation is 
reflected in the content of the slivers themselves, most of which commemorate hesitant steps 
towards the inclusion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people as civic equals. To pass 
through Reconciliation Place is to understand the Aboriginal struggle as a struggle for 
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inclusion. The colonial wrong to which Reconciliation Place responds is not the appropriation 
of Aboriginal land and sovereignty but discrimination. From this perspective, the possibility 
of post-invasion legitimation rests on recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders as 
part of the people.  
By setting up the Embassy and flying the Aboriginal flag, the protestors fundamentally 
contested this representation of Australia as a unified people in waiting. On the one hand, they 
explicitly rejected their (nominal) inclusion in the people from which the constituted power 
draws its legitimacy. As aliens they could have no part in the ‘we’ whose basic normative 
agreements find expression in the constitutional document and whose identity of purpose 
underwrites the laws that regulate the common life. The constituted power could thus neither 
draw legitimacy from them nor claim to be representative of them. On the other hand, they 
invoked a pan-Aboriginal political community whose consent was fundamental to the 
legitimacy of the constituted power. In contrast to Reconciliation Place, which functions as a 
sign of community and provides a site for mediating conflict, the Embassy functions as a sign 
of division and provides a site for making visible an antagonism between different 
understandings of the people.  
The Aboriginal Embassy disturbs many non-Aboriginal people because it signals a 
secessionist movement. Yet the Embassy also prefigures another possible form of being 
together. As such, the Ambassadors’ refusal of citizenship should not be seen as a refusal of 
all community with non-Aboriginal people but of the particular form of political association 
presupposed by the constituted order. The Aboriginal Embassy has always been a place where 
Aboriginal people and non-Aboriginal supporters come together on terms that are determined 
by Aboriginal political actors. In this way, it prefigures another possible political community. 
This alternative polity is also implicit in the claim by Embassy activists that they do not need 
the Australian state to recognize Aboriginal sovereignty. Rather, the Australian state needs the 
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recognition of Aboriginal people to become legitimate since it ‘cannot acquire a legal, valid 
title except by entering into a legal, binding TREATY of international status with Aboriginal 
People of this our country’ (Gilbert 1993, 52). The call for a treaty can thus be understood as 
a call to reconfigure the terms of political association between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
people in Australia. As an act of constituent power, the Embassy does not just make visible 
the antagonism between the interests of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and that 
of the Australian people presupposed by the constituted order. It also reveals how political 
community between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people might be constituted differently. 
 
Resignifying Theft and Trespass: the Immanent Outside of the Constituted Power 
Throughout our analysis we have drawn a clear distinction between two modes of politics. 
Following Negri, we have valorised the constituent power of the Aboriginal Embassy as a 
creative demonstration that reveals the reactionary nature of the politics of reconciliation, 
which is tied to an immanent constitutionalism. This is undoubtedly reductive. Both modes of 
politics are clearly more complex than this.15 However, our purpose has not been to 
differentiate authentic from inauthentic expressions of Aboriginal politics but to interpret the 
different constitutional registers on which the Embassy and the reconciliation process work. 
This has involved a double move. First, we have looked to the Embassy as a source of 
political knowledge about the Australian state and society. This drew our attention to how the 
reconciliation movement was a reaction to the struggle for land rights and sovereignty. 
Second, in responding to the Aboriginal Embassy, we have sought to understand the 
significance of the claim it makes upon the Australian state and society. And we have tried to 
amplify that claim by exploring its resonance within the philosophical debates about the 
concept of sovereignty that the Embassy strategically invokes. The value of considering the 
politics of reconciliation and Aboriginal sovereignty in relation to the constitutional paradox 
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is that it reveals these as two modes of politics that work in different ways to politicize or 
depoliticize the constitution of the Australian polity. 
In this final section, we consider the limits of Negri’s approach in order to complicate 
our analysis of the Embassy’s constitutional politics. Negri’s insistence on the antagonism 
between constituent and constituted power provides an interpretive grid for recognizing some 
conditions of possibility for fundamental social transformation. Viewed as an expression of 
constituent power, the Embassy demonstrates the possibility of a break with the colonial past 
that is frequently invoked in the politics of reconciliation but which the constituted power is 
incapable of enacting in its own right. The formal reconciliation process tames the social 
antagonism for which the Aboriginal Embassy seeks to find a political register by re-
presenting the Aboriginal struggle over sovereignty and land as a struggle against cultural 
discrimination that is remediable through attitudinal change. As a demonstration of 
Aboriginal sovereignty in the here and now, the Embassy exposes the ideological nature of 
this separation of the political and the economic. Its presence makes visible the economic 
dimensions of oppressive social relations within a settler-colonial capitalist democracy and 
points to a more fundamental rupture with the existing order that is required to begin the 
process of decolonization (Wadjularbinna 2005, 106).16 
Yet there are some difficulties with Negri’s political ontology. His vitalistic 
understanding of the subject of constituent power as a purely creative force neglects the extent 
to which constituent acts typically entail a negative moment of dis-identification alongside a 
positive moment of self-creation (see Rancière 2010, 84f.). Tony Coorey’s spontaneous idea 
to name the protest in 1972 the Aboriginal Embassy was undoubtedly highly creative (Foley 
2010).17 But it also shows the way in which the constituent power of the Embassy relies on a 
moment of negation.18 This moment of dis-identification is key to understanding how an 
antagonistic conflict that cannot be accommodated by the constituted power might 
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nonetheless find a register within that constitutional order. We explore this line of inquiry by 
examining two key events at the Embassy: firstly, the removal of a Bronze Coat of Arms from 
old Parliament House in 2002 and secondly, the apparent discovery of a right to camp at the 
Embassy in 1972. In both cases, it is the act of dis-identification that leads to a reflexive 
questioning of the right of occupation. By strategically utilising their ambiguous status as 
Aboriginal citizens, the protestors succeed in bringing another order of signification into play, 
allowing accusations of theft and trespass to be turned back upon the constituted power in an 
indictment of its own illegitimacy. 
Theft 
On the thirtieth anniversary of the Aboriginal Embassy in 2002 Arabunna elder, Kevin 
Buzzacott reclaimed the totems of Emu and Kangaroo from the constituted power by 
removing a bronze Coat of Arms from old Parliament House to the Embassy. ‘These people’ 
claimed Buzzacott, ‘are not the real government of this country, they don’t have authority to 
steal our animals, the kangaroo and emu, and claim them to be theirs’ (Buzzacott cited in 
Probyn 2002). Though Buzzacott was later convicted under the Crimes Act this was clearly 
no ordinary theft (Regina v Buzzacott 2004). As an attack on the symbols of the nation 
committed by one of its own citizens, the removal of the Coat of Arms spoke of a disloyalty 
bordering on treason. Yet, by dis-identifying as an ordinary member of the people, Buzzacott 
signified his act as one of repatriation rather than theft. In asserting his status as an Arabunna 
man, he turned the removal of the Coat of Arms into a public judgment upon an earlier act of 
theft: the appropriation of Aboriginal land and the usurpation of Aboriginal sovereignty by 
the Australian state. By refusing his assigned identity as an ordinary citizen, in other words, 
Buzzacott’s act recalls (and symbolically corrects) that crime of the invaders that was no 
ordinary theft.  
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Buzzacott’s explicit division of society into ‘us’ and ‘them’ recalls Negri’s radical 
opposition between constituent and constituted power. Yet, the symbolic power of 
Buzzacott’s attempt to repatriate the Emu and Kangaroo hinges upon the moment of dis-
identification: the moment when two different orders of signification are crossed and their 
meaning reconfigured. Buzzacott’s removal of the Coat of Arms provokes reflection upon the 
invading society’s right of occupation because it first conjoins the symbols of sovereignty and 
appropriation in the discursive framework of the constituted power. By reclaiming the 
emblem of the constituted power, Buzzacott establishes a link between sovereignty and theft 
that is then subverted through dis-identification. As the act of an Aboriginal man rather than a 
citizen of Australia, the removal of the Coat of Arms ceases to be a sign of disloyalty and 
becomes a sign of fidelity. In effect it says: this is not what we have done to you, but what 
you have done to us. It is often assumed that the Embassy mimics and parodies the sovereign 
state by, for instance, flying a flag and appointing a minister for Caucasian affairs. In contrast, 
Buzzacott’s strategic manipulation of the symbols of power reveals how it is the Australian 
state that mimics the Aboriginal sovereignty it usurps. His act of repatriation reveals how the 
constituted power lacks the sovereignty that Aboriginal people possess.19 
Trespass 
The Aboriginal Embassy began when four men pitched a beach umbrella on the lawns of Old 
Parliament House. According to Gary Foley, the plan originally decided by the activists in 
Redfern (Sydney) in 1972 was to stage a small demonstration in Canberra on the national 
holiday with the aim of the four protestors getting arrested. This would attract media attention 
ahead of a larger protest that was to be held on the weekend. When met by Australian Capital 
Territory police, however, the four protestors sitting beneath a beach umbrella were surprised 
to be informed that there was no law to prevent them from camping on the lawn, so long as 
there were fewer than eleven tents. This prompted them to return the next day with a proper 
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tent to serve as the office of the Aboriginal Embassy in front of which they placed a letterbox, 
which began receiving mail the following day (Foley 2010, 16). As Roberta Sykes recalled, 
the activists seemed to have discovered that they enjoyed a unique right, as Aboriginal people, 
to camp on Crown land in front of Parliament House:  
At the time, the Northern Territory was just that, a territory, administered by the 
politicians and public servants in Canberra, and containing quite large sections of 
Crown land. The government had framed a law that there was to be no camping 
on Crown land. However, because Crown land in the Northern Territory was 
home to dispossessed Aboriginal people who had nowhere else to live, this law 
specifically excluded Aborigines. The expanse of land in front of Parliament 
House was also Crown land, but it had obviously never entered the minds of the 
politicians that Aborigines would set up camp there. (Sykes 2001, 236-237) 
The often repeated story of the legal loophole by which the Embassy became an 
indefinite presence in the Parliamentary Triangle highlights the importance of dis-
identification to the symbolic power of the protest. In this instance, however, the politicisation 
of the constitutional order derives, not from the refusal of a certain representation of 
citizenship, but from the refusal of a certain representation of Aboriginality. As Sykes makes 
clear, the Aboriginal entitlement to camp on Crown land (an entitlement apparently not 
enjoyed by other citizens) derives from their particular history of dispossession. It is only 
because they have ‘nowhere else to live’ that they are excluded from the general prohibition 
and excused of trespass. However the naming of the site as the Aboriginal Embassy marks a 
dis-identification with this de-politicised, abject Aboriginal who survives in the constituted 
order only in the form of an exception. By asserting sovereignty, the Ambassadors claimed 
full possession over land in which the constituted power permits them nothing more than a 
usufructory right. The politicisation of the lawns of Old Parliament House turns upon this act 
22 
of dis-identification in which the Ambassadors draw upon their anomalous status as 
Aboriginal citizens only to subvert it to another end. The Ambassadors are allowed to ‘camp’ 
indefinitely because they have supposedly been made homeless by history, but this indefinite 
encampment becomes a permanent protest because they reject such a limited view of who 
they are and the kind of rights they (now) possess. 
In July 1972, the government sought to close the ‘loophole’ in the law that protestors 
had inadvertently exposed, by introducing the Trespass on Commonwealth Lands Ordinance 
(1972). Immediately after it was gazetted the police moved on the Embassy in two violent 
clashes with the protestors. The ordinance was self-evidently intended to re-assert the right of 
the constituted power to define public space. Yet its dependence upon recasting the Embassy 
activists as ordinary citizens guilty of criminal activity rendered it a dismal failure. 
Undertaken under the auspices of an Aboriginal entitlement to camp, the erection of the 
Embassy proved difficult to re-characterise as an act of trespass in the order of symbolic 
forms. On the contrary, the need for the constituted power to pass the ordinance merely 
confirmed the invader society as the original trespasser. As Paul Coe (2011) recently 
reflected, in provoking the government in this way, the Embassy made visible white violence. 
It revealed to a national audience the structural violence that Aboriginal people suffer 
everywhere in Australia as a consequence of dispossession. Official sensitivity to this fact was 
patently apparent when the Aboriginal people arrested at the site in July 1972 were issued 
with traffic offences rather than charged under the Trespass on Commonwealth Lands 
Ordinance published that morning. This, as Sykes comments, was a way of ensuring that they 
could not claim to be political prisoners (Sykes in Cavadini 1972).  
It is for this same political reason that Aboriginal people effectively continue to exercise 
a de facto entitlement to camp at the Embassy site, even though the camp remains technically 
illegal. Consistent with its espoused democratic principles, the Australian state acknowledges 
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the right of Aboriginal people to protest in front of the Old Parliament House in their role as 
citizens (or authors of the law). Yet the Australian government and the National Capital 
Authority have often sought to remove the Aboriginal Embassy on the grounds that no citizen 
(as addressee of the law) is permitted to camp within the Parliamentary precinct. The 
Embassy activists break down this dichotomy by insisting that camping is an integral aspect 
of their protest as Aboriginal people. In this way they have managed to sustain a protest of 
indefinite duration that would be impossible for other citizens (Brisbane City Enterprises 
2003, 23; Mutual Mediations 2005). 
 
In their own way, each of these episodes highlights the ambiguous status of Aboriginal people 
as citizens both within and without the community presupposed by the Australian state. As 
such, the speaking position of alien that the Aboriginal Embassy affords is not one of a simple 
exclusion from the constituted order. For this exclusion is constitutive of the terms of 
citizenship that the Embassy contests. This ambiguous status has proved a double-edged 
sword for Aboriginal people. Most devastatingly, it makes Aboriginal people susceptible to 
discriminatory treatment in which their cultural difference serves as a pretext for the 
restriction or suspension of their rights as citizens. This is exemplified in the ongoing 
Northern Territory National Emergency response, which has involved among other things, the 
suspension of the Racial Discrimination Act (1975) (see Watson 2009b; Moreton-Robinson 
2009; Tedmanson & Wadivel 2010). Yet, to some extent, it enables Aboriginal people to find 
a register within the constituted order to bring their claim against it. The Embassy activists are 
able to present a rival image of political community to that presupposed by the constituted 
order by virtue of their status as ‘immanent outsiders’ to that order (Isin 2002).  
By exploiting this status as immanent outsider, the Embassy succeeds in demonstrating 
the possibility of a break with the colonial past that the Australian state often glibly invokes 
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but never enacts. Yet most politicians and citizens refuse to seize the political opportunity that 
the Embassy affords. The Australian state and society might be impelled by its own 
legitimacy crisis to seek to resolve the constitutional paradox through an immanent 
constitutionalism of reconciliation. At the same time, however, it is compelled to defuse 
Aboriginal claims to sovereignty and land because it identifies the interest of the national 
community with that of the mining and pastoral industries from which the colonizing society 
has always derived its wealth. If the constituent power of the Embassy ultimately depends on 
the mobilization of non-Aboriginal supporters in order to bring about fundamental change, it 
remains to be seen what social, economic and cultural events might incite such action. In the 
meantime, the presence and event of the Embassy in the national capital continues to 
prefigure another possible community between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people. 
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1 Pre-empting the judgment of history, he expressed his hope that the day be remembered as one in which ‘we’ 
finally stepped away from ‘our’ racist past and brought ‘the first two centuries of our settled history to a close’ 
(Rudd 2008). As an act of purification and unification, the apology would ‘remove a great stain from the nation’s 
soul’ and help to forge a ‘fully united and fully reconciled people’ (Rudd 2008). 
2 In 1988, Labor Prime Minister Bob Hawke promised that a treaty would be negotiated. But this was reneged on 
in favour of the reconciliation process announced in 1991. Notably, the formal reconciliation process concluded 
in 2001 with the recommendation by the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation (CAR) that a treaty be 
negotiated. 
3 Far from breaking with the past, the continuity of reconciliation with the history of colonial relations was 
highlighted in a cartoon that appeared in the Canberra Times in 1991. An Aboriginal Elder is talking to two 
young people, explaining, 'A long time ago we had decimation...then we had assimilation...after that, 
integration...and then, along came self-determination'. One of the youngsters asks, 'What have we got now?' 
Behind the boy, Robert Tickner, Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs is jumping about 
down crying 'Yoo Hoo!', while waving a flag that says 'Reconciliation'. 
4 The activists were Michael Anderson, Bertie Williams, Billie Craigie and Gary Williams 
5 The Embassy was removed by police on three occasions in July 1972. It reappeared intermittently throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s. In 1979, for instance, it was temporarily established on Capitol Hill, the site on which the 
new Parliament House (which opened in 1988) was to be constructed. 
6 ‘We, the members of the Aboriginal Nation and Peoples, do hereby give notice of invoking our claim to all the 
land of the Territories of our ancestors. Accordingly, we invoke the Rule of International Law that we have 
never surrendered nor acquiesced in our claim to these lands and territories. This occupation of the site of old 
Parliament building is evidence of our right to self-government and self-determination in our lands and 
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territories. We therefore draw the attention of the International Community and the United Nations to our 
peaceful and lawful right of occupation to our lands and territories’ (reproduced in Gilbert 1993, 62). 
7 The four were Isabel Coe, Ian Williams, Sonya Laughten-Brown and Harold Williams. 
8 ‘All the later generations’, Habermas (2001, 774) writes, ‘have the task of actualising the still-untapped 
normative substance of the system of rights laid down in the original document of the constitution’. 
9 Negri revives a distinction between potenza (strength) and potestas (power). As potenza, constitutent power is a 
‘basis’, an incomplete and ultimately infinite repository of strength actualised by the multitude than manifests in 
revolution. As potestas, constituted power is a ‘summit’, a rigid and formal structure of power lodged in the 
sovereign that manifests in containment (Negri 1999, 13). 
10 In particular, he has a vitalistic conception of the subject of constituent power and he presupposes a 
metaphysics of presence (e.g. see Frank 2000; Rancière 2010). We will consider some of the limits of Negri’s 
approach in the final section of this paper. 
11 Indeed the burden of proof is now placed on Aboriginal peoples to demonstrate their ongoing traditional 
connection to ancestral lands in order for a weak form of access right called ‘native title’ to be recognized in 
law). 
12 In personal conversation, a senior curator within the Museum of Australian Democracy speculated that the 
institution owes its existence to the Tent Embassy. For while Old Parliament House had been disused since 
1988, within a month of its occupation by Aboriginal protestors in January 2002, the federal government found a 
use for it. 
13 Another senior curator at the Museum of Australian Democracy told me that the institution had remained 
essentially passive in its relation to the Embassy. 
14 This is consistent with a revisionist history currently underway in Australia as exemplified in the recent 
television documentary, The First Australians and advocated by high profile Aboriginal media commentators 
such as Noel Pearson. These commentators erroneously attribute the principle of self-determination to policies 
pursued by the Australian state since the 1970s, which they argue have failed. Instead, Pearson argues for 
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economic participation and individualism as the way forward for Aboriginal people. As Gary Foley (2011) 
highlights, however, self-determination was never a principle of the state but is what the Aboriginal struggle has 
always been about: it cannot have failed since it has never been tried by the state. 
15 For instance, many Aboriginal people were involved in the formal reconciliation process and sought to win 
incremental gains in their struggle for justice by engaging in it. Local Ngamberri woman, Matilda House, 
supported the construction of Reconciliation Place and gave the first welcome to country at Parliament House on 
the day of Rudd’s apology. Matilda House defended the Embassy in 1972 and is a cousin of Isobelle Coe who, 
together with her family, has committed herself to keep the Embassy going for the last forty years. On the other 
hand, while most Aboriginal people support the on-going presence of the Embassy in Canberra, some question 
the authority of the current Tent Ambassadors to represent them. Some of the key players in the 1972 protest to 
do not support the on-going protest at the site. And some traditional land owners in Canberra, including Matilda 
House, have called on the people currently camped at the Embassy to leave on the basis that they have not shown 
proper respect for country (ABC 2005). 
16 In an open letter to (then) Prime Minister John Howard, Wadjularbinna Nulyarimma (Gugnalidda Elder and a 
Member and Elder of the Aboriginal Tent Embassy) wrote in 2005: ‘Reconciliation without justice is 
genocide…Since we don’t have a national voice and there is much unfinished business, it is important that the 
Aboriginal Embassy remains as a place of self-determination, which flows from our sovereign right in this 
land…Aboriginal people from all parts of Australia come to the Embassy, because grass-roots Aboriginal people 
are out of sight and out of mind. We see the Embassy as a place of unfinished business and a place where people 
from all walks of life can come together and for that to happen we reach out to non-Aboriginal people who are 
living in fear and confusion’ (Wadjularbinna 2005, 106) 
17 Significantly, the Embassy and the Black Power movement in Redfern was seminal to the resurgence of 
Aboriginal cultural creativity in urban centres, particularly in theatre, film and music, led by influential figures 
such as Murray Islander, Bob Mazza. 
34 
                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 The dis-identification that the Embassy speaks back to the constituted order is put bluntly by Kevin Gilbert 
(1993, 13): ‘You are not a people to be proud of….We do not wish to shake hands and blot out the horror, 
effacing it by joining you as assimilated citizens thank you very much.’ The purpose of this act of dis-
identification is not to discredit those Aboriginal people who identify as Australian (albeit ambivalently) and 
recognize citizenship as the hard-won victory of political struggle (Chesterman 2005; Maddison 2009). It is 
rather to highlight the injustice of expropriation in regards to which citizenship is inadequate compensation. 
19 This point was succinctly put in a sign displayed at the Embassy in 1992, a time when Prime Minister Paul 
Keating has initiated a public debate about replacing the British Queen with an Australian head of state: ‘Where 
will the Republic get its sovereignty?’ 
